Untrusting network coding by Büyükalp, Yasin et al.
Untrusting Network Coding
Yasin Bu¨yu¨kalp∗, Ghid Maatouk†, Vinod M. Prabhakaran‡, Christina Fragouli†
∗ Middle East Technical University, Turkey
E-mail: e162594@metu.edu.tr
† Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne, Switzerland
E-mail: {ghid.maatouk, christina.fragouli}@epfl.ch
‡ Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, India
E-mail: vinodmp@tifr.res.in
Abstract—In networks that perform linear network coding, an
intermediate network node may receive a much larger number
of linear equations of the source symbols than the number of
messages it needs to send. For networks constructed by untrusted
nodes, we propose a relaxed measure of security: we want to
be untrusting, and allow each intermediate node to only learn
as much information as the number of independent messages
it needs to send. In this paper we formulate this problem
and provide sufficient and necessary conditions for classes of
combination networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a set of h non-colocated unit rate sources
S1, . . . , Sh that would like to multicast information to a set
of receivers (with min-cut h) over a network G = (V,E) with
untrusted nodes, i.e., where the intermediate network nodes
may try to passively eavesdrop and infer the sources’ informa-
tion. As communication networks move towards more flexible,
temporary and less controlled structures, communication using
such untrusted nodes is common, and we expect it to become
even more so.
One approach to dealing with untrusted networks is to impose
strict security requirements, namely, to require that the net-
work nodes learn nothing about the source messages. We can
indeed use secure network coding designs [1], [2], [3], [4],
[5], [6] to protect from a passive eavesdropper, Eve, who has
access to at most k edges of the network; in our setting, where
Eve has access to a network node, k would be the number of
incoming edges in Eve’s node. The security comes at the cost
of throughput; namely, applying the techniques of [1]-[6], we
cannot hope to achieve an information rate higher than h− k.
Thus, if Eve’s node has the same min-cut as a receiver, our
throughput becomes zero.
In this paper we take a different approach: we do not want to
sacrifice throughput, but we also do not want to be secure, we
just want to be ‘untrusting.’ That is, we do not require that
the network nodes learn nothing about the source messages;
we just require they do not learn anything they do not need
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to know. We ask that each intermediate node only learns as
many independent linear combinations of the source messages
as it needs to forward (even if it has a much larger number of
incoming edges), so that receivers experience rate h.
To achieve this, we allow the sources to collaborate with each
other, i.e., to exchange information among them; we assume
they can achieve this through an auxiliary network H that does
not use any of the edges in G. Our cost is the bandwidth that
is used for the source collaboration.
To summarize, our problem formulation differs from secure
network coding in two ways: (i) we do not ask for security
guarantees in the usual sense, since the untrusted nodes still
learn some information about the sent messages - but this
information is the minimum possible, and (ii) our security does
not come at the cost of throughput experience for the receivers,
but at the cost of bandwidth connecting the sources.
If the in-degree of a node is smaller or equal to the out-
degree, our requirement is by default satisfied; the cases that
are interesting are when a node has high in-degree and low
out-degree. Motivated from this observation, in this paper we
started examining combination networks, where the nodes that
perform coding have in-degree up to h and out-degree one.
For the class of combination networks, it turns out that there
exist schemes, described in this paper, that solve our problem
by applying the basic principle of one-time pad encryption.
Note that these schemes provide unconditional, information-
theoretic guarantees bounding the amount of information
learned by intermediate nodes.
Our contributions are:
• We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for a family
of networks (which we refer to as canonical combination
networks) and exactly characterize the associated cost.
• We provide sufficient conditions for a more general family
of networks and upper bounds on the associated cost.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II formalizes
our problem statement; Section III solves as an example the
butterfly network; Section IV looks at canonical combination
networks; Section V provides algorithms and bounds for gen-
eral combination networks and finally Section VI concludes
the paper with a short discussion.
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Fig. 1: A combination network with h sources, m bottleneck
edges (Ai, Bi), and N ≤
(
m
h
)
receivers, each receiver observ-
ing a distinct subset of h B-nodes.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E) with
unit capacity edges, with h not-colocated unit rate sources
S1, . . . , Sh, N receivers, and untrusted intermediate network
nodes. Each source Si wishes to multicast its message Xi to
all receivers. We assume that the min-cut to each receiver is h,
and that G is a minimal network, in the sense that removing
any edge reduces the min-cut for at least one receiver. We
also assume that a valid network code over a field of size 2`,
that allows each receiver to decode the h sources, has been
designed using any of the methods in the literature [7]. We
have at our disposal an auxiliary network H that can be used
to provide alternative connections for the source nodes. We
want to minimize the number of edges in H that we use,
while allowing each intermediate node to learn at most as
many linear combinations of the source messages as its out-
degree. We assume that intermediate nodes do not collaborate.
In this paper we will focus our attention exclusively on
combination networks that we describe below; our goal is to
formulate necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure secrecy
at every coding point in the combination network, with the
additional constraint that no extra network resources should
be used, and no decrease in throughput is allowed.
Combination Network: A combination network consists of h
unit-rate source nodes, m intermediary nodes or coding points
A1, . . . , Am controlling m bottleneck links (Ai, Bi), and a
maximum of
(
m
h
)
receivers R1, . . . , RN , each observing h
independent linear combinations of the source messages on
a distinct subset of h intermediary nodes Bi, as shown in
Fig. 1. Note that coding points are not necessarily connected
to all sources.
Definition 1: We describe as canonical the set of combination
networks that have the following properties: (i) h coding
points, say A1, . . . , Ah, have in-degree 1 and the only incom-
ing edge for coding point Ai comes from source Si, (ii) m−h
coding points are connected to all h sources, and (iii) we have
all possible N =
(
m
h
)
receivers.
Note that canonical combination networks are minimal.
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Fig. 2: A secure scheme for the butterfly network.
Security Requirement: The following definition formalizes the
secrecy requirement that was described in the introduction.
Definition 2: Assume a network that employs a linear network
code over a field Fq , with q = 2`. Let v ∈ V be an
intermediary node (i.e., not a source or a receiver node)
with in-degree d1 and out-degree d2, where the incoming
edges are carrying messages Y1, . . . , Yd1 . We say the secrecy
requirement at v is met if
I(X1, . . . , Xh;Y1, . . . , Yd1) ≤ d2 log q.
Apart from enforcing secrecy at intermediate nodes, we also
require that source node Si should not learn any information
about the message Xj of a source Sj , for i 6= j.
III. THE BUTTERFLY NETWORK
Here we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for our
secrecy requirements to be met over the butterfly network1 in
Fig. 2. Although this network is extremely simple, we will
see that the core ideas that allow us to characterize secrecy
for more general networks are already at play here.
In Fig. 2, with the standard solution, node A receives values
X1 and X2 from the two sources and XORs them to produce
the value X1 +X2, which it sends on its outgoing edge. Thus
node A learns two independent linear combinations of the
source messages, namely, X1 and X2, and produces one linear
combination of the source messages.
A. Sufficient condition for secrecy: We here claim that it is
sufficient to connect the sources with a unit rate edge of
arbitrary direction. Indeed, assume this edge points from S1
to S2. S1 can generate a unit rate random key k and share
it with S2. Both sources XOR k to their outgoing messages
X1 and X2 before sending these to A. The one-time pad k is
independent from both X1 and X2; thus, the incoming edges
of A carry, seperately, no information about either source
message. However, by XORing the messages they carry, A
will still produce the desired linear combination X1 + X2.
B. Necessary condition for secrecy: We now show that the
sufficient condition for secrecy derived above is optimal.
Assume there exist two unit-rate directed edges between the
sources S1 and S2. The following lemma provides a lower
1Note that the butterfly network is a special case of a canonical combination
network, where h = 2 and m = 3, and where we have replaced two “trivial”
coding points by direct links (Si, Ri).
bound on the communication required between the sources if
the secrecy requirement at node A is to be met.
Lemma 1: In the butterfly network, secrecy at the (unique
nontrivial) coding point can be ensured iff the directed edges
connecting the sources have a sum-rate of at least unity.
Proof: The if-part follows easily from the sufficiency
condition2. To see the only-if-part, for any pair of nodes V,W
in the butterfly network of Fig. 2, denote by YVW the message
transmitted on the edge between V and W . Let ri = 1 be the
rate of transmission of source Si and rij the rate of the directed
link from source Si to source Sj . The security requirement in
this case amounts to
I(X1X2;YS1,A, YS2,A) ≤ 1. (1)
Cut-set bounds for decodability give us
r1 ≤ r1,2 + I(X1;YS1,A) (2)
r2 ≤ r2,1 + I(X2;YS2,A), (3)
where (2) follows from a cut which separates nodes S1 and R1
from nodes S2, A,B, and R2, and similarly, (3) follows from
a cut which separates nodes S2 and R2 from nodes S1, A,B,
and R1. From these we get
r1 + r2 − (r1,2 + r2,1) ≤ I(X1;YS1,A) + I(X2;YS2,A)
≤ I(X1;YS1,A, X2) + I(X2;YS2,A)
= I(X1;YS1,A|X2) + I(X2;YS2,A)
≤ I(X1;YS1,A, YS2,A|X2)
+ I(X2;YS1,A, YS2,A)
= I(X1, X2;YS1,A, YS2,A) ≤ 1,
where the last inequality follows from (1). This gives us
r1,2 + r2,1 ≥ 1, since the sources transmit at unit-rate.
IV. CANONICAL COMBINATION NETWORKS
In this section, we build on the butterfly network example
to derive matching necessary and sufficient conditions for
canonical combination networks (see definition 1).
A. Sufficient conditions for secrecy (and an algorithm)
Theorem 1 gives a sufficient condition to ensure secrecy at
all coding points in the canonical combination network. We
prove this theorem constructively.
Theorem 1: In the canonical combination network, the secrecy
requirement can be enforced at all coding points if the auxil-
iary network contains a unit-rate tree connecting the sources
(the edges of the tree may have arbitrary directions).
Proof: At the coding points of in-degree 1, the secrecy
requirement is trivially met. Consider a coding point A of in-
degree h and suppose there exists a unit-rate directed tree T
connecting the sources.
For edge e = (Si, Sj) ∈ T , call Si the “tail” of the edge
and Sj its “head”. Assume that the linear combination that
2We may need to consider an appropriately large blocklength so that the
links between the sources can carry integral rate keys. Such details are omitted
in the sequel.
A must send on its outgoing edge is
∑h
i=1 aiXi, where the
ai are scalars over F2` . The secure coding scheme works as
follows:
1) Over each edge e ∈ T , the tail generates a key ke
and sends it to the head. Keys for different edges are
independent.
2) Node Si sends to A the value aiXi +
∑
e:Si∈e ke, i.e.,
it sends its scaled message aiXi added to all keys it
sees on its neighboring (whether incoming or outgoing)
edges. Let us call the sum of all keys seen by a node
its node key.
3) Node A receives {aiXi +
∑
e:Si∈e ke}hi=1, i.e., h linear
combinations; it adds them and sends the result to B.
To see that the scheme actually produces the desired linear
combination on the outgoing edge of A, note that what A
computes is the sum
h∑
i=1
(
aiXi +
∑
e:Si∈e
ke
)
=
h∑
i=1
aiXi +
(
h∑
i=1
∑
e:Si∈e
ke
)
,
where the summation
∑h
i=1
∑
e:Si∈e ke performs in fact a
double counting of the tree edges.
We have restricted our attention to one coding point A, but it
is easy to see that unless the intermediate nodes collude, the
same keys can be used for ensuring secrecy with respect to
every intermediate node at no additional transmission cost.
Example 1: Fig. 3a shows the application of the tree scheme
in a simple combination network.
B. Necessary condition for secrecy
Theorem 2 gives a lower bound on the rate of information
exchange that must take place among the sources.
Theorem 2: A necessary condition for secrecy at all points
of the canonical combination network is that, in the auxiliary
network H that connects the sources, the (undirected) min-cut
separating every pair of sources in H has at least unit value.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that there is a cut which
partitions the sources into M1 and M2 such that the min-cut
is less that unity, i.e.,∑
(i,j):Si∈M1, Sj∈M2
(rij + rji) < 1. (4)
We may assume without loss of generality that S1 ∈M1 and
S2 ∈M2. Let A1, . . . , Ah be the h coding points of in-degree
1, each of them controlling the bottleneck link (Ai, Bi)
and let A be any coding point of in-degree h controlling
the bottleneck link (A,B). We will prove that secrecy at A
cannot hold if all receivers decode correctly, thereby leading
to a contradiction.
Recall that each of the
(
m
h
)
receivers is connected to
a distinct subset of h second-layer intermediary nodes.
In particular, consider the receiver that observes the set
{B1, B3, . . . , Bh, B} (where B2 does not appear): call this
receiver R1. Also consider the receiver that observes the set
{B2, B3, . . . , Bh, B} (where B1 does not appear): call this
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(a) A secure scheme for a canonical com-
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Fig. 3: The tree scheme for canonical and general combination networks. In each case, a subset of the coding points is depicted.
receiver R2. Now we may view the network connecting the
sources and the receivers R1, R2 as follows: we have two
(composite) sources, namely, M1 and M2. There are |M1|−1
unit rate links from source M1 and |M2| − 1 unit rate links
from source M2 to receivers R1 and R2 (given by the links
through B3, . . . , Bh). There is a unit rate link from M1 to
R1 and similarly another from M2 to R2 (corresponding to
B1 and B2, respectively). Finally, there is a coding point A
with a unit rate edge to B. Let YM1,A and YM2,A denote,
respectively, what the composite sources M1 and M2 send to
A. Proceeding with the cut-set bounds for decodability at the
receivers as in the proof of Lemma 1, we can write
|M1| ≤ (|M1| − 1) +
∑
(i,j):Si∈M1, Sj∈M2
rij + I(M1;YM1,A)
|M2| ≤ (|M2| − 1) +
∑
(i,j):Si∈M1, Sj∈M2
rji + I(M2;YM2,A),
Proceeding as before we get
2−
∑
(i,j):Si∈M1, Sj∈M2
(rij + rji) ≤ I(S1, S2;YS1,A, YS2,A).
But, substituting from (4), we have that the left hand side is
strictly greater than one. This violates the secrecy requirement,
a contradiction.
Actually, it is easy to verify that the necessary condition in the
statement of Theorem 2 is also a sufficient condition. The tree
scheme of section IV-A is thus one of many possible schemes
that ensure secrecy at all coding points, with the additional
property that it minimizes the number of edges of H . Note
that an additional attractive feature of the tree scheme is that
in a connected network, one can always find a spanning tree
in polynomial time.
V. GENERAL COMBINATION NETWORKS
We now discuss sufficient conditions for general combination
networks, show how these reduce to a combinatorial problem,
and propose a heuristic algorithm for its solution3.
A. Sufficient conditions as a combinatorial problem
We saw in the previous section that a sufficient condition for
canonical networks is to use the auxiliary network H to create
a tree (of arbitrary orientation). This tree in canonical networks
is used only once, although we may have an arbitrary number
m of (non-colluding) coding points; intuitively, the tree allows
each source to have a “node key” such that the keys of all
sources sum to zero, while jointly, the h keys have entropy
h−1. The same source keys can be used for all coding points
since the coding points are not colluding.
In non-canonical combination networks, what changes is that
coding points may be connected to any subset of the h sources.
A sufficient condition in this case would also be that, if a
coding point i is connected to a subset Ci ⊆ [1 : h] of
the h sources (call it its parent) with |Ci| = k, say sources
S1, . . . , Sk, these specific k sources are connected in H with
a unit rate tree Ti. Indeed, if such a tree exists, we can apply
the same algorithm as in the previous section, and create keys
so that the node keys of sources S1, . . . , Sk sum to zero.
However, now the same source keys can only be used for the
coding points that have common parents. If our network has
multiple coding points j, and the parents of different coding
points are different subsets of the source nodes, each such
subset needs to be connected directly with a tree Tj , for our
desings to apply. Note that the trees Tj do not need to be
disjoint; in fact, if we want to minimize the use of resources,
we should select the trees Tj so that jointly they use the
minimum number of edges, as Example 2 illustrates.
3Note that the combinatorial problem defined in this section does not
provide necessary conditions for secrecy over general combination networks.
Indeed, simple counterexamples show that for some network configurations,
the optimal solution to the combinatorial problem is strictly suboptimal in
terms of of the number-of-edges/rate-of-information-exchange of the auxiliary
network.
Example 2: Consider the network in Fig. 3b and two coding
points, the first connected to the subset C1 = {S1, S2} of
the sources and the second to the set C2 of all sources.
To apply our coding scheme, we can connect the source
nodes as in Fig. 3b in two trees, and use the coding scheme
shown in the same figure. Alternatively, we can use the more
efficient scheme in Fig. 3c: in this second scheme we use
edge (S1, S2) for both trees.
Note that what interests us now is no longer the number
m of coding points, but rather the number n of types of
coding points, that is, the number of distinct subsets of the
sources, of cardinality larger than 1, seen by various coding
points4. For example, for the canonical combination network,
n = 1. Typically, n could be much smaller than h, which
motivates expressing the minimal connectivity requirements
at the sources in terms of n. Thus, our sufficient condition is
reduced to the following combinatorial problem.
Combinatorial formulation: Given h nodes and n sets Ci ⊆
[1 : h], create a graph H that connects the h nodes with a set
of edges EH of cardinality as small as possible, so that the
induced subgraph on each set Ci contains a spanning tree.
This problem can be visualized with the use of Venn diagrams
as the following example illustrates.
Example 3: Fig. 4 depicts the case of n = 3 sets and 8
source nodes; the constructed graph H has the property that
each induced subgraph on Ci contains a spanning tree. Here,
connecting the sources through a single tree is not sufficient.
C1 C2
C3
Fig. 4: Venn diagram representation of our requirements. Dots
represent sources, and sets Ci correspond to subsets of sources
characterizing types of coding points.
B. A method to construct H
As seen above, we may partition the set of h sources into
parts of the form
PI =
(⋂
i∈I
Ci
)⋂⋂
j /∈I
C¯j
 , where I ⊆ [1 : n].
Definition 3: A non-empty part PI is said to be active.
It is clear that for a given valid H , without increasing the
number of edges, we may replace the induced subgraph on an
active part with any spanning tree on the nodes of that part.
Thus, without loss of generality, when convenient we may treat
each active part as containing only a single node which stands
in for a spanning tree on the nodes of the part.
4For coding points seeing exactly one source, the secrecy requirement is
trivially satisfied.
Definition 4: The level of a part PI is the cardinality of I .
Definition 5: An active part PI is said to lead an active PJ if
I ⊇ J . In this case, PJ is said to follow PI .
Definition 6: An active PI is called a leader if it does not
follow any other active part. Otherwise, it is called a follower.
The following steps will produce a valid graph H:
1) Classify active parts into leaders and followers.
2) Form a spanning tree inside each active part.
3) Add an edge between the tree of each follower and the
tree of one of the leaders it follows.
4) Connect the trees of the leaders such that all pairs of
leaders PI , PJ with I ∩ J = {i1, . . ., ik} non-empty
have, for each j = 1, . . ., k, a path between them in
the subgraph induced by Cj . I.e., we add edges between
some pairs of leaders such that the leaders in each set Cj
are connected in the subgraph induced by Cj .
Note that while the first step is unambiguous, there are several
potential choices for the next three. We already argued that the
choices made in step two do not affect the number of edges in
the resulting H . The same holds for step three5. The choices
made in the last step may affect the quality of H produced; we
will give upper bounds on the number of edges in Section V-C.
C. Upper bound on the needed number of edges
We will use the lemma below to derive an upper bound on the
number of edges produced by the above algorithm.
Lemma 2: The number of leaders is at most
(
n
bn/2c
)
.
Proof: Let Nk =
(
n
k
)
be the number of parts of level
k. The proof follows from arguing that the largest number of
leaders results when all parts of level bn/2c (the level with
maximal size) are the only leaders.
If there are, say, m leaders in a level k, we can argue that
this will prevent at least m parts from being leaders in a level
p, where p is such that Np ≥ Nk. Suppose k > p. Consider
the graph where the parts are the vertices and an edge exists
between PI and PJ if I ⊂ J or J ⊂ I . The number of
edges between a part at level k and the parts at level p is
(
k
p
)
,
and there are Nk parts at level k, giving rise to Nk
(
k
p
)
edges
between the two levels. By symmetry, each part at level p has
Nk
(
k
p
)
/Np edges from level k. The m leaders at level k are
responsible for m
(
k
p
)
edges to level p. Hence, the number of
parts at level p who are ruled out from being leaders is at least
m
(
k
p
)
Nk
(
k
p
)
/Np
= m
Np
Nk
≥ m.
5The argument is as follows: given any valid H , without increasing the
number of edges we may perform the following operations and still keep
the graph valid. (i) Every follower who does not have an edge to a leader it
follows may have one of its edges removed and replaced by an edge to one
of the leaders it follows (note that being a follower implies that it has at least
one edge). (ii) Every follower PI who has an edge to a leader PJ it follows
and has another edge to some part PL (PL could be another leader it follows)
may have this second edge removed and replaced by an edge between PJ and
PL. Note that after these two steps every follower has only one edge which
has at the other end one of the leaders it follows. (iii) Now if a follower has
more than one leader, then we may remove this single edge and replace it
with another edge to any one of the leaders it follows.
A similar counting argument holds for k < p.
Thus, if the only active parts fall in two levels, say, levels k1
and k2, the number of leaders is at most max(Nk1 , Nk2). Now,
suppose the active levels are k1, k2, k3 with Nk1 ≤ Nk2 ≤
Nk3 . Suppose there are m1 leaders in level k1 and m2 in
level k2. Then, the m1 leaders in level k1 will preclude at
least m1 parts in level k2 from being leaders. These m1 parts
in level k2 along with the m2 leaders in the same level will
preclude at least m1 + m2 parts from being leaders in level
k3. Thus, the largest number of leaders possible is Nk3 =
max(Nk1 , Nk2 , Nk3). This clearly extends to any number of
active levels and completes the proof.
Clearly, a trivial upper bound on the number of edges needed
in the graph H is
(
h
2
)
, i.e., if H is the complete graph on the
h source nodes. For the cases where n < h, we can improve
on this upper bound using the steps in Section V-B.
Theorem 3: The number of edges in an optimal valid graph
H is not larger than
h + (n− 1)
(
n− 1
bn−12 c
)
− n.
Proof: We will follow our algorithm. Let h source nodes
belong to l leaders and f followers. Then the total number
of active parts is f + l. Let hi denote the number of source
nodes in part Pi. In step 2, where we create a spanning tree
in each part, we add
f+l∑
i=1
hi − 1 = h − (f + l) edges. Then,
in step 3, we connect each follower to any one of the leaders
it follows. As a result, the total number of edges becomes
h − (f + l) + f = h − l. Now, in step 4, edges are added
so that leaders in each set Ci are connected to each other in
the subgraph induced by Ci. At worst, this can be done by
connecting the leaders of each set Ci, without sharing any edge
between different sets. Let li represent the number of leaders
in set Ci. Thus, in step 4, we will have at most
∑n
i=1(li− 1)
edges. But, l ≥ li for all i ∈ 1, 2, ..., n and thus, l ≥ max(li).
Using these facts, the number of edges in an optimal valid
graph H is at most
h− l +
n∑
i=1
(li − 1) ≤ h +
n∑
i:li 6=max(li)
li − n.
But li is at most the largest number of leaders PI with i ∈ I ,
and by Lemma 2,
li ≤
(
n− 1
bn−12 c
)
.
Thus, an upper bound on the number of edges of H is
h + (n− 1)
(
n− 1
bn−12 c
)
− n.
Note that for the canonical combination network case, where
n = 1, this bound is tight since it reduces to h− 1. Similarly,
the bound reduces to h− 1 for n = 2, so that we know that a
tree is sufficient for combination networks with two types of
coding points of in-degree larger than 1.
C2
C1
C3
Fig. 5: Tree in the case where n = 3 and P[1:3] is active.
The following lemma gives an optimal solution for the case
where some coding point sees all h sources.
Lemma 3: If part P[1:n] =
⋂
i=1...n Ci is active, then it is
sufficient to use a single tree on the h sources nodes.
Proof: Clearly P[1:n] is the only leader and all other parts
are followers, thus step 4 is trivial and for step 3 it suffices
to connect with a single edge the tree of each active follower
with the tree in P[1:n]. Fig. 5 shows an example for n = 3.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we started exploring a new definition of security
relevant for networks that perform linear network coding:
can we allow each intermediate node to only learn as many
linear combinations as it needs to forward, although it may
have a much larger incoming degree? We showed that this is
possible for combination networks by providing an auxiliary
network H that connects the sources; we derived sufficient and
necessary conditions for canonical networks, and showed that
for general combination networks, the sufficient conditions
reduce to a combinatorial problem.
Combination networks have the special property that coding
points directly receive input from the source nodes and not
other coding points; it is easy to find examples of networks
that do not meet this condition, and where we cannot meet our
security conditions by only connecting the source nodes with
an auxiliary network H . To deal with such networks, we may
need to allow the auxiliary network H to also connect coding
points inside the network (the source nodes can be viewed as
a special class of coding points), or to sacrifice some of the
min-cut rate; this is part of our future research.
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